This study analyzes the complete historical performance of Jim Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio from 2001 to 2016 which includes many of the stock recommendations made on Cramer's TV show "Mad Money". Both since inception of the portfolio and since the start of "Mad Money" in 2005 (when it was converted into a charitable trust), Cramer's portfolio has underperformed the S&P 500 total return index and a basket of S&P 500 stocks that does not reinvest dividends (both on an overall returns basis and in Sharpe ratio). These findings contrast with previous studies which analyzed Cramer's outperformance in short windows before the 2008 financial crisis. Using factor analysis, we find that Cramer's portfolio returns are primarily driven by underlevered exposure to market returns and in some specifications tilting toward small cap stocks, growth stocks and stocks with low quality of earnings. These results have broad implications for market efficiency, the usefulness of single name stock recommendations made on television, financial education, and the implementation of academic factors thematic in Cramer's portfolio.
Introduction
The usefulness of the financial advice from CNBC financial markets commentator Jim
Cramer and other television finance personalities has historically been one of controversy.
Cramer, unlike many other TV finance personalities, actually manages a stock portfolio that invests in many of his stock recommendations made on his television show Mad Money. Alerts PLUS Portfolio was converted into a charitable trust, and adopted the policy that any dividend or other cash distributions would be donated to charity. The portfolio has had relative stability in terms of its management over time, while Cramer lists himself as a "co-portfolio manager" of the Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio. Recently in February 2015, Stephanie Link, the other Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio "co-portfolio manager" left TheStreet.com to join TIAA-CREF, being replaced by Jack Mohr.
Initially established in
While previous papers have examined Cramer's pre-financial crisis portfolio returns (Bolster and Trahan (2009)) or the market impact of his stock recommendations made on TV (Engelberg and Parsons (2011) ), this is the first paper to fully examine the entire history of Jim Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio returns before and after the financial crisis, adding seven years of post-financial crisis returns data from Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio. Further, this is the first paper to test for the potential presence of quality (QMJ) and betting against beta (BAB) factors in Cramer's portfolio, in addition to the traditional leverage (MKT-Rf), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (UMD) factors. We take the same approach the same respect that Frazzini, Kabiller and Pedersen (2012) , who analyze the risk factors underlying Warren Buffett's entre portfolio return history at Berkshire Hathaway.
We find that Cramer's AAP has underperformed the S&P 500 total return index and a basket of S&P 500 stocks that does not reinvest dividends both since inception of the portfolio and since the inception of Mad Money. In addition, Cramer's portfolio has a lower Sharpe ratio than both benchmarks over the same time period.
We also find over the portfolio's entire history that Cramer's AAP portfolio exposures are primarily driven by underlevered exposure to market returns (MKT-Rf) in every specification, which has heavily contributed to underperforming the S&P 500 in post-financial crisis years. In other specifications, we find evidence of a tilt toward small cap stocks, growth stocks, and stocks with low quality of earnings. Also, when controlling for various factors in various specifications, the negative alpha (intercept) from the regression no longer becomes statistically significant. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the data and our empirical strategy. Section 4 reviews the results and Section 5 concludes.
Literature
Several papers examine the short-term market impact of Jim Cramer's stock recommendations. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) and Engelberg et al. (2012) disentangle the causal impact of media reporting from the impact of the events being reported. The authors then find that average abnormal overnight returns following his recommendations are over 3% for their entire sample and over 6% for stocks in the smallest quintile. The authors also find that the price response is increasing in the number of wealthy viewers who watch the show but are unaffected by the number of low income households viewing the recommendations. The main thrust of this study, however, is in determining whether or not certain stock recommendations are more impactful than others, and whether or not the segment of the show in which the recommendation appears is priced. Results of this study can be used to make inferences regarding the efficiency by which information promoted via a popular television show may influence investor behavior (i.e. price discovery, market liquidity, market volatility & trading volume). Expanding on the findings of Neumann and Kenny (2007), Parsons (2011), and Engelberg et al. (2012) , results from this study can be used to determine if media endorsements of individual stocks lead to mispricing, and whether or not the retail investor is bearing that cost. The implications of this research have the potential to reposition prior research and to augment future thrusts in financial market research.
Instead, this paper seeks to examine the long-term performance of Cramer's stock recommendations, in particular the performance of Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio, commonly referred to as his charitable trust, which invests in the recommendations that he makes on Mad Money. This paper builds on Bolster, Trahan and Venkateswaran (2012) and Bolster and Trahan (2009) , adding seven years of post-financial crisis returns data from Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio.
In addition, we test for the presence of other factors such as the Betting Against Beta (BAB) factor of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and the Quality Minus Junk (QMJ) quality factor of Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) .
No studies to our knowledge analyze the performance of Jim Cramer's charitable trust (Action Alerts PLUS portfolio) since its inception through the post-Great Recession crisis period.
Bolster, Trahan and Venkateswaran (2012) Their analysis is limited to 3.5 years from 2005 to 2008 and does not observe returns during a full recession period. In addition, they do not regress on any BAB or quality factors.
Data and Empirical Strategy

Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio (Mad Money 'Charitable Trust') Returns Data
Returns data from the Action Alerts Portfolio PLUS are provided by TheStreet.com which are also made available to the public (See Table 1 , Figure 1 ). Subscribers are also given access to portfolio holdings data which we use to confirm some the findings of our risk factor analysis.
CRSP Mutual Fund Return Data
We also compare Cramer's returns to the active equity mutual fund universe. To do so, we obtained the returns from the CRSP Mutual Fund database for all active equity mutual funds that were active during some period between August 2001 and December 2015 (see Figure 2 ).
Factor Data and Analysis
In our factor analysis of Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio excess returns (Rp,tRf,t), we run several specifications using popular academic factors. We also run the regressions This includes the CAPM (Equation 1) regressing Cramer's excess returns on a leverage factor (MKT-Rf) defined by the S&P 500 minus the risk-free 3-month T-bill rate:
Our analysis also includes a Fama-French (1993) that includes a momentum factor (UMD), also obtained from the Ken French data library:
(Rp,t -Rf,t) = α + βMKT* (Rm,t -Rf,t) + βSMB * SMB t + βHML*HML,t + βHML*UMD,t + εt (3)
In separate specifications, we also regress Cramer's excess returns on the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) Betting-Against-Beta factor and the Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) Quality Minus Junk (QMJ) factor.
Results
Factor Attribution
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2 . Analyzing the entire history of the portfolio, our CAPM specification finds a CAPM Beta of approximately 0.95 (statistically significant at the 1% level) and a negative alpha of -2.38% that is statistically significant (at the 10% level). Being underleveraged (underinvesting in the market portfolio) in part may be a result of the portfolio's policy of not reinvesting cash dividends.
Across almost all of our specifications, the results demonstrate that underleverage explains most of the portfolios relative underperformance given the S&P 500's positive absolute performance over the period. This is also confirmed by the portfolio holdings data which indicates that the AAP portfolio often holds a significant cash position, largely to make its annual cash distribution in March to make charitable contributions.
In our Fama-French (1993) three factor specification, we do find that the portfolio has some exposure to small caps given that the SMB factor is statistically significant at the 10% level, something confirmed by the portfolio holdings data. We do not find such a statistical significance when only looking at the entire history of Mad Money from 2005.
Also, when controlling for momentum factors in our Carhart (1997) four factor specification, statistical significance of the size factor also disappears nor do we find evidence of statistically significant exposure to momentum stocks.
However, we do find that when analyzing the March 2005 to March 2016 time period, when adding the extra size, value and momentum factors in the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 4 Factor regressions that the statistical significance of the negative alpha of -3.06%, found in the CAPM for the same period, disappears.
When we include the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) Betting-Against-Beta factor and the Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) Quality Minus Junk (QMJ) factor, we find some evidence that Cramer tilts toward growth stocks and away from stocks with high quality of earnings.
Factor Replication
Using the factor analysis results obtained above, we also construct a "robo-Cramer" portfolio that uses the same factor loadings as estimated from the regressions (Figure 3 ). The systematic Cramer-style portfolio is constructed from the same regressions of monthly excess returns in 3.2, namely the Carhart Four Factor regression using data over the entire time period 
Financial Education and Portfolio Diversification Among 'Mad Money' Viewers
There is an important question of how many viewers have used Cramer's financial advice in their own portfolio decisions.
Ratings from Nielsen (Figure 4 ) indicate the number of Mad Money viewers has waned in recent years.
Analyzing TheStreet.com's public financial disclosures also provides some insight into the number of subscribers potentially taking Jim Cramer's stock advice provided through this Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio, which sends daily stock pick updates to viewers. TheStreet.com (TST) held its IPO at the height of the tech bubble in 1999 and while remaining a public company, stock price has fallen as well (Figure 6a ). However, revenue for subscriptions to TheStreet.com's subscriptions has steadily risen (Figure 6b ), indicating that consumers may not be responding to waning performance relative to the S&P 500.
Cramer's Get Rich Carefully suggests that the number of subscribers (who pay roughly $15 a month or more) is in the millions. CNBC has responded to concerns about consumer protection by placing extensive disclosures at the introduction of each episode of Mad Money and during commercial breaks.
Indeed, CNBC at present requires Cramer to not trade any stock picks he recommends on his show for 5 days after in 2005 he was temporarily banned from the network for "talking his book".
While some have advocated banning various forms of televised investment advice to protect individuals with little knowledge, education or information, this question along with others about consumer protection outside the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
This paper is the first study to analyze Jim Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio returns over its entire history with data from post-financial crisis years. Previous studies have only analyzed various periods of outperformance leading up to the financial crisis. We find that the portfolio's overall underperformance relative to the S&P 500 is primarily driven by being underlevered to the market portfolio. Such underleverage has allowed the portfolio to miss out on substantial upside in post-crisis years. In various specifications, we also find some evidence of exposures to small cap stocks, growth stocks and stocks with low quality of earnings.
Since unlike previous papers which find outperformance in pre-crisis years, adding postcrisis years we find that Cramer has underperformed the S&P 500 since the inception of his portfolio and the inception of Mad Money even when controlling for leverage and other academic factors, this arguably has certain implications for star performance and market efficiency theory.
These results also have several implication TV stock advice disclosure policy and financial education, which is outside the scope of this paper. Notes: These tables display regressions modelling Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS Portfolio returns as a function of various academically studied factors, namely MKT-Rf (leverage), SMB (size), HML (value), and UMD (momentum). Separate regressions were run using BAB (betting against beta) and QMJ (quality) factors, however neither were found to be statistically significant in additional specifications. The SMB, HML, and UMD factors were obtained from the Fama-French Data Library. The BAB and QMJ factors were obtained from Andrea Frazzini's website data library. ***Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, **Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level, *Indicates statistically significant at the 10% level Notes: This table shows calendar-time portfolio returns. We report the statistics for a systematic mimicking portfolio of Cramer's Action Alerts PLUS portfolio strategy. The systematic Cramer-style portfolio is constructed from a regression of monthly excess returns. The portfolio is rebalanced annually to keep constant weights. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns of the standard size, value, and momentum factors. 
